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Bridging the Safe Drinking Water Gap for
California’s Rural Poor
By Camille Pannu*
Spurred by decades of inaction and continued exposure to unsafe drinking
water, community leaders from California’s disadvantaged communities1 (DACs)
advocated for the creation of a human right to water2 under state law.3 Shortly

*
Camille Pannu is the Director of the Water Justice Clinic, Aoki Center for Critical
Race and Nation Studies at UC Davis School of Law. I thank the residents of California’s
disadvantaged communities, and the organizations that amplify their voices, for their tireless
efforts to extend water justice to our state’s most vulnerable people. Additionally, I thank
Olivia Molodanof, Jessica Durney, and the Editors of the Hastings Environmental Law
Journal for their patient and thoughtful editing. All errors are, of course, my own.
1. “Disadvantaged community” has become a legal term of art for an alternative
poverty measure that compares a community’s relative socioeconomic status (median
household income) to the statewide median household income level. See, e.g., CAL. WATER
CODE § 79505.5(a).
2. ASSEMB. B. 685, 2012 Leg. (Cal. 2012), codified at CAL. WATER CODE § 106.3(a)
(“It is hereby declared to be the established policy of the state that every human being has
the right to safe, clean, affordable, and accessible water adequate for human consumption,
cooking, and sanitary purposes.”).
3. California has long recognized that residential drinking water is the highest
beneficial use within the State’s beneficial uses framework, CAL. CONST. art X, § 2; WATER
CODE § 100. See CAL. WATER CODE § 106, codifying Meridian, Ltd. v. City & Cty. of San
Francisco, 13 Cal.2d 424, 450 (1939). Nonetheless, prior to the passage of the Human Right
to Water bill, several San Joaquin Valley local governments maintained that they had no
obligation to protect domestic water use over agricultural irrigation, or to identify and
provide access to safe, clean drinking water to rural residents. See, e.g., TULARE CTY.
PLANNING DEP’T, TULARE COUNTY GENERAL PLAN § 2.D.3 (1971) (setting forth a policy of
“starving” disadvantaged unincorporated communities of funding); MADERA CTY.
PLANNING DEP’T, Housing Element in MADERA COUNTY GENERAL PLAN (1969) (adopting a
policy of directing funds away from rural communities and to cities); MADERA CTY.
PLANNING DEP’T, Background Rep. in MADERA COUNTY GENERAL PLAN UPDATE, at 1-2
(1995) (maintaining the 1969 Plan objectives, including disinvestment in rural
communities); CHIONE FLEGAL ET AL., POLICYLINK, CALIFORNIA UNINCORPORATED:
MAPPING DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY 6, 19–20 (2013)
(describing infrastructure deficits in unincorporated communities and their correlation with
race); Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931,
932–34 (2010) (describing the creation of concentrated poverty and racialized inequality
through the denial of essential infrastructure to unincorporated communities adjacent to, or
within the growth boundaries of, cities throughout the United States); Victor Rubin et al.,
Unincorporated Communities in the San Joaquin Valley: Responses to Poverty, Inequity,
and a System of Unresponsive Governance, at 2, 5–6, 16, 18–19, 21–22 (2007) (unpublished
report on file with author) (describing local governments’ lack of political will and financing
capacity with respect to disadvantaged unincorporated communities).
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thereafter, the California Legislature put forward a bond4 to finance much needed
water infrastructure improvements and drought relief interventions across the state.
Voters approved the $7.45 billion bond,5 which reserved millions of dollars of
funding for DACs with persistent water quality problems.6 In setting aside those
funds, the Legislature acknowledged that decades of disinvestment7 in rural,
disadvantaged communities had created severe water contamination, limited water
access, and degraded water infrastructure.8 The bond’s initiating legislation tacitly
recognized that taxing DAC residents was futile;9 those residents had the fewest
resources available to address the disinvestment that compounded their water
inequality.

4. ASSEMB. B. 1471, 2014 Leg. (Cal. 2014); CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, Proposition 1:
Water Bond in CALIFORNIA 2014 GENERAL ELECTION OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE,
http://vigarchive.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/en/propositions/1/
[https://perma.cc/5RHN-6AHM].
5. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, NOVEMBER 4, 2014 GENERAL ELECTION STATEMENT OF
VOTE 14 (2014).
6. ASSEMB. B. 1471, supra note 4, codified in relevant part at WATER CODE §§
79720–79725.
7. See generally Camille Pannu, Drinking Water and Exclusion: A Case Study from
California’s Central Valley, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 223, 232–34 (2011) (suggesting that
policies of withholding investment from disadvantaged unincorporated communities did not
encourage consolidation, annexation, or relocation, but rather, “deepen[ed] infrastructure
inequality and ultimately maintain[ed] bleak levels of poverty.”); Rubin et al., supra note 3,
at 5–6; Laura Bliss, Before California’s Drought, a Century of Disparity, CITYLAB (Oct. 1,
2015), https://www.citylab.com/environment/2015/10/before-californias-drought-a-centur
y-of-disparity/407743/ [https://perma.cc/AKT2-75JM].
8. WATER CODE § 79721(c), (g)–(h).
9. Id. §§ 79724–25.
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Nearly five years later, over one million10 Californians still lack access to
clean, safe, and affordable drinking water.11 The majority of those Californians
are Latinx and live in disadvantaged unincorporated communities (DUCs)12
throughout the state’s rural agricultural belts.13 The greatest number of
noncompliant public water systems is located in the San Joaquin Valley,14 where
approximately forty percent of DUCs with noncompliant systems are located

10. Yet that figure almost certainly underestimates the number of Californians
exposed to unsafe drinking water. In 2016, more than 18 million Californians lived within
the boundaries of a water system that failed to monitor or report their water quality, meaning
that for certain time periods, there is little to no water quality data available for a large subset
of the population. See State Water Res. Control Bd., 2016 Compliance Report dataset
(2017) [hereinafter “2016 Compliance Report Dataset”]. The State Water Board’s Annual
Compliance Report also does not include information for small water systems regulated
under state law, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 116275(n), nor does it include water quality
data for individuals who rely on private wells for drinking water. STATE WATER RES.
CONTROL BD., 2016 ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT 3–4 (2017) [hereinafter “2016
COMPLIANCE REPORT”]. Additionally, because the Annual Compliance Report focuses on
water quality, testing, and public disclosure requirements and does not provide data on
affordability, it is difficult to determine whether water is affordable and whether there is a
correlation between unaffordable water and water quality. For additional discussion of the
affordability-water quality gap, see Brett Walton, California Hones Drinking Water
Affordability Plan, CIRCLE OF BLUE (June 8, 2017); JULIET CHRISTIAN-SMITH ET AL., PAC.
INST., ASSESSING WATER AFFORDABILITY: A PILOT STUDY IN TWO REGIONS OF CALIFORNIA
10 (Aug. 2013) (finding 23% of Sacramento area households and 51% of Tulare Lake Basin
households paid unaffordable water rates).
11. See 2016 COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2 (Table 1, Part A).
12. Although “DAC” and “DUC” are often used interchangeably in policy discourse,
there is a subtle but significant difference between the two terms. In the context of
California water policy, disadvantaged communities (DACs) can exist in rural areas and
within cities. WATER CODE § 79505.5(a); PUB. RES. CODE § 75005(g). Disadvantaged
unincorporated communities (DUCs), however, are not found within the incorporated
territory of a city. GOV’T CODE § 65302.10(a)(2)–(5). In some cases, those unincorporated
communities are entirely surrounded by a city but are not included within that city’s
boundaries and are unable to vote in city elections. Id. § 65302.10(a)(4).
13. 2016 Compliance Report Dataset; State Water Res. Control Bd., Human Right to
Water Dataset: Noncompliant Systems (2017) [hereinafter, “HRTW Dataset”]; see also
JONATHAN LONDON ET AL., THE STRUGGLE FOR WATER JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA’S SAN
JOAQUIN VALLEY: A FOCUS ON DISADVANTAGED UNINCORPORATED COMMUNITIES REPORT
30 (Feb. 2018), https://regionalchange.ucdavis.edu/publication/water-justice [https://
perma.cc/UYV4-RHY4]. With the exception of a water treatment lapse that affected
3,987,622 Angelenos, violations with potential direct public health impacts affected
1,007,055 Californians in 2016. 2016 COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 2, 16–17.
Taken together, water contamination and treatment violations exposed 4,994,677 (12.6%)
Californians to unsafe drinking water in 2016. See 2016 Compliance Report dataset, supra
note 10 (total population affected by contaminant and treatment violations); U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, CALIFORNIA: POPULATION (Dec. 21, 2017) (used to calculate the share of the
population exposed to contaminant and treatment violations); 2016 COMPLIANCE REPORT,
supra note 10, at 2, 16–17.
14. See 2016 Compliance Report Dataset, supra note 10.
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within a mile of a city’s borders, while one-third are too far15 from a city’s borders
to extend drinking water service.16 These dire spatial and racial inequalities
suggest that California must explore new strategies to augment current efforts to
implement the human right to water.
Despite the extensive number of noncompliant DUC water systems located
far from any city’s boundaries, local government agencies, rural and community
advocates, and state agency staff have primarily focused on working with cities to
extend residential water service to nearby rural communities.17 To be sure, as the
primary drivers of land-use planning and growth, cities play an important role in
eliminating water inequality. But ongoing racial and spatial disparities in access
to safe drinking water suggest that although state programs have improved drinking
water access for rural communities within one to three miles of a city boundary,
policy and funding gaps persist.
This commentary argues that advocates and policymakers must look to a
broader array of possible water providers to redress water inequality in DUCs
located more than three miles from a city’s borders. It briefly describes the land
development patterns that drove the creation of “remote DUCs,”18 and argues that
the State must take into account those histories when addressing water inequality
in those communities. Finally, the commentary concludes with suggestions for
policy changes that may engender sustainable solutions for remote DUCs.

15. Although “far” is a relative term, I use it to refer to communities three or more
miles from a city’s borders. California’s drinking water funding programs often extend
water infrastructure from a compliant system to a noncompliant system only if the
population receiving service falls within three miles of an existing water system or source.
In practice, extensions are often limited to systems within a mile of each other, increasing
the share of “remote” DUCs to just over sixty percent. See LONDON ET AL., supra note 13,
at 32 (reporting that 61% of DUCs are located more than one mile from a city’s borders).
16. LONDON ET AL., supra note 13, at 32.
17. In 2015, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed California Senate Bill
88, which authorized the State Water Resources Control Board to require that systems
serving unsafe or unreliable drinking water to DUCs, or mutual water companies serving
unsafe water to any disadvantaged community, consolidate with compliant systems. Of the
eleven DUC system consolidations that have been completed since Senate Bill 88 entered
into force, all eleven occurred in the San Joaquin Valley, and eight (72.7%) involved
connection to a city water system. See STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., MANDATORY
CONSOLIDATION OR EXTENSION OF SERVICE FOR DISADVANTAGED COMMUNITIES,
https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/drinking_water/programs/compliance/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8Q79-RZWM] (last updated Dec. 18, 2017, and last accessed Feb. 20,
2018).
18. Throughout this commentary, I refer to DUCs located more than three miles from
a city’s borders as “remote DUCs.” California law refers to DUCs that are landlocked by a
city as “islands,” while those DUCs that share a border with a city are often referred to as
“fringe” or “peripheral” communities. GOV’T CODE § 65302.10(a)(3)–(5); see also FLEGAL
ET AL., supra note 3, at 21–22 (setting forth the framework for California’s DUC typology).
Advocates have not agreed on a unified term to refer to DUCs located farther than three
miles from a city’s borders.
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A.

DUCs May Be Remote, But Their Existence Is Not Random.

In order to craft effective drinking water policy interventions, decision
makers must take into account the historical development (and growth) of remote
DUCs. Although some policymakers have suggested that remote DUCs are
byproducts of sprawl-based development, the majority of those DUCs predate
contemporary urban boundaries. Additionally, remote DUCs represent a sizable
portion of the total number of DUCs throughout the state. In the San Joaquin
Valley, alone, approximately forty-four percent of DUCs (231 of 525) are
remote—a figure roughly equal to the number of “fringe” DUCs.19 Both the
number and location of remote DUCs suggest that their development occurred
independently of urban development patterns.20
Most remote DUCs formed during periods of economic expansion, and those
communities remained close to industries that had formed through that expansion,
even after local jobs moved or disappeared. For example, the remote DUCs of
Cortez and Cressey (Merced County) were originally established as Japanese
farming colonies in the early 1900s, and both are located on what was then the
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway (“Santa Fe”) line.21 Grayson (Stanislaus
County), a remote DUC, was established in the 1860s and served as a thriving river
port until water from the San Joaquin River was diverted for agricultural
irrigation.22 The remote DUC of Allensworth (Tulare County) was founded in
1908 along the Santa Fe line as the first African American freedom colony23 west
of the Mississippi.24 Although the Allensworth train depot was ultimately
removed, it still serves as a whistle stop for the Amtrak trains that travel along the

19. FLEGAL ET AL., supra note 3, at 22.
20. See Lauren Richter, Constructing insignificance: critical race perspectives on
institutional failure in environmental justice communities, 4 ENVTL. SOCIOLOGY 107, 111–
12 (2017) (gathering sources).
21. See generally VALERIE J. MATSUMOTO, FARMING THE HOME PLACE: A JAPANESE
AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN CALIFORNIA, 1919–1982 (1993) (recounting the founding and
development of three Japanese-American farming colonies, with special focus on Cortez).
22. JERRY MACMULLEN, PADDLEWHEEL DAYS IN CALIFORNIA 81, 145 (1970).
23. Freedom colonies were independent, rural settlements that African Americans
created to enable land ownership and self-sufficiency, and after the Civil War, to escape the
structural racism and violence of the Jim Crow South. See generally THAD SITTON & JAMES
H. CONRAD, FREEDOM COLONIES: INDEPENDENT BLACK TEXANS IN THE TIME OF JIM CROW
(2005); PATRICIA C. CLICK, TIME FULL OF TRIAL: THE ROANOKE ISLAND FREEDMEN’S
COLONY, 1862–1867 (2001); see also JESSICA GORDON NEMBHARD, COLLECTIVE COURAGE:
A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 34–
40 (2014) (discussing pre-Civil War African American farming colonies).
24. ALICE C. ROYAL, ALLENSWORTH, THE FREEDOM COLONY: A CALIFORNIA
AFRICAN AMERICAN TOWNSHIP 84–91 (1st ed. 2008); see also Leslie Fulbright, Battle for
piece of black history: Allensworth, a town founded for African Americans, may get new
neighbors–2 huge dairy farms, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 8, 2007).
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same freight lines that existed over 100 years ago.25 And in the Salinas Valley, the
arrival of the Southern Pacific Railroad catalyzed local agricultural development
by reducing the cost of shipping agricultural products.26 With the Southern
Pacific’s extension in 1867 came the growth of several remote DUCs, including
Chualar, Las Lomas, and Castroville.27
Meanwhile, federal land policy laid the groundwork for the development of
remote DUCs in the western San Joaquin Valley and in the Imperial Valley.28 The
federal Reclamation Act of 1902 originally sought to break up land empires by
dividing large farms into parcels of 160 acres for the creation of small farming
homesteads.29 In addition to increasing the number of family farms, receipt of a
federal allotment entitled the landowner to subsidized water provided by the
Central Valley Project.30 Instead of creating small farms, however, the Bureau of
Reclamation allowed nonresident land barons to create enormous farms well in
excess of the original 160-acre limit.31 As those large-scale farming operations
grew, so grew nearby settlements of agricultural workers.32

25. Amtrak, Map: San Joaquins Line, https://www.amtrak.com/san-joaquins-train
[https://perma.cc/9J6M-9H8E]; see generally, DAVID IGLER, INDUSTRIAL COWBOYS:
MILLER & LUX AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FAR WEST, 1850–1920, at 60–91 (2d ed.
2005) (discussing the history of railroad-driven land speculation, water rights accumulation,
and development in California).
26. City of Salinas, History, https://www.cityofsalinas.org/visitors/salinas-history
[https://perma.cc/SM73-ZXX2].
27. DAVID L. DURHAM, CALIFORNIA’S GEOGRAPHIC NAMES: A GAZETTEER OF
HISTORIC AND MODERN NAMES OF THE STATE 885 (1998).
28. See Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 815–17
(9th Cir. 1990) (describing the history of the Reclamation Act); see also Yellen v. Hickel,
352 F. Supp. 1300, 1306 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (although Yellen was later vacated as moot, it
describes noncompliance with the Reclamation Act and the formation of agricultural land
baronies in the Imperial Valley); see also Mary Louise Frampton, The Enforcement of
Federal Reclamation Law in the Westlands Water District: A Broken Promise, 13 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 89, 91–103 (1979) (discussing the Bureau of Reclamation’s role in enabling
large land conglomerates in the western San Joaquin Valley); Lloyd Carter, Reaping Riches
in a Wretched Region: Subsidized Industrial Farming and Its Link to Perpetual Poverty, 3
GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5, 6, 8–11, 14–16 (2009) (recounting the use of Reclamation
Act lands to concentrate land ownership in the Westlands Water District); Paul S. Taylor,
National Reclamation in Imperial Valley: Law v. Policy, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 125 (1983);
Robert G. Schonfeld, The Early Development of California’s Imperial Valley: Part I, 50 S.
CAL. Q. 279 (1968).
29. 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
30. Id.
31. Frampton, supra note 28, at 92–93; Carter, supra note 28, at 10–11, 13. In 1926,
Congress amended the Reclamation Act to allow the Interior Department to sell water to
farms with lands in excess of the original 160-acre limit. See 43 U.S.C. § 423e.
32. For example, the remote DUC of Westley was originally a farm worker labor
camp. Stanislaus Cty., Brief History, UNINCORPORATED CITIES: WESTLEY, http://www.stan
county.com/board/unincorporated-cities/westley.shtm
[https://perma.cc/DTM4-36PW].
The remote DUCs of Cantua Creek and El Porvenir formed to provide labor for the grain
harvest and to transport agricultural goods to market. MACMULLEN, supra note 22.
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Even after the removal of train depots and abandonment of river transport,
agricultural enterprises and nearby DUCs persisted. For some communities,
persistence was an act of self-determination.33 For others, the collapse of local
economic opportunity drove down real estate prices, depriving residents of their
home equity and discouraging prospective buyers from moving into remote
communities.34 When combined with exclusionary zoning, redlining, the siting of
undesirable land uses, and a lack of affordable housing in cities,35 many remote
DUCs became loci for concentrated rural poverty.36
By miscategorizing remote DUCs as byproducts of contemporary, sprawlbased development, decision makers have incorrectly assumed that remote DUCs
share the same characteristics as fringe and island DUCs, which are geographically
closer to cities. As a result, California’s drinking water policies have chiefly
focused on extending service from cities to remote DUCs.
By acknowledging the decades-long relationship between industrial
development (and later collapse), disinvestment, racial exclusion, and economic
vulnerability, decision makers can reframe their understanding of the root causes
of water inequality in remote DUCs. At a practical level, a shift in framing would
enable policymakers to consider a broader array of solution sets to address water
inequality in remote DUCs. A historical examination of remote DUCs lays bare
uncomfortable and painful histories in which elected officials and government
employees used the deprivation of essential infrastructure—including drinking
water—to subordinate low-income communities of color. But in laying bare that
history, we also uncover the moral and ethical imperatives that require us to redress
persistent water inequality.

33. See, e.g., MATSUMOTO, supra note 21; ROYAL, supra note 24.
34. See Pannu, supra note 7, at 231–34, 236 (discussing the racially disparate
demographics of rural poverty in the San Joaquin Valley, and the relationship between
infrastructure disinvestment and property values).
35. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion
at the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1106–13, 1118 (2008) (discussing the
deprivation of public services, siting unhealthy land uses, inadequate affordable housing,
racial inequality, and concentrated poverty in DUCs); see also Nancy L. Simmons,
Memories and Miracles—Housing the Rural Poor Along the United States–Mexico Border:
A Comparative Discussion of Colonia Formation and Remediation in El Paso County,
Texas, and Doña Ana County, New Mexico, 27 N.M. L. REV. 33 (1997) (discussing housing
and rural poverty among communities of color in fringe and remote DUCs); Craig Anthony
Arnold, Planning for Environmental Justice, 59 PLANNING & ENVTL. L. 3, 3–4 (Mar. 2007)
(discussing siting undesirable land uses in communities of color).
36. See DANIEL T. LICHTER & DOMENICO PARISI, CARSEY INST., CONCENTRATED
RURAL POVERTY AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF EXCLUSION 1–3 (Fall 2008); Pannu, supra note 7,
at 231–34; Rubin et al., supra note 3, at 4–5.
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B.

When Considering How to Extend Safe Drinking Water to
Rural Communities, Scholars and Policymakers Have
Primarily Focused on Proximity to Cities.

Policy discourse and interventions to address safe drinking water access in
rural communities have primarily focused on the role of cities in extending service
to, or annexing, fringe and island DUCs. Academics and policymakers have
rightfully noted that sustainable water planning has a land-use nexus,37 and that
sprawl-based development38 that fails to account for water supplies risks creating
or exacerbating local water insecurity.39 Local government scholars have
suggested that water supply and quality must be integrated into the municipal
planning process,40 arguing that cities’ historical and contemporary policies of

37. See Sarah Bates, Bridging the Governance Gap: Emerging Strategies to
Integrate Water and Land Use Planning, 52 NAT. RES. J. 61, 69–81 (2012); see also Lora
A. Lucero, Water Supplies and Growth—The Elephant in the Living Room, 62 PLAN. &
ENVTL. L. 3, 4, 6–7 (2010) (discussing planning paradigms that account for limited water
supplies and the effects of climate change); A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering,
Water and Western Growth, 59 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3 (2007); Craig Anthony Arnold, CleanWater Land Use, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 291 (2006); Nicole Carter et al., Closing the
Circle: Linking Land Use Planning and Water Management at the Local Level, 22 LAND
USE POL’Y 115 (2005); A. Dan Tarlock & Lora A. Lucero, Connecting Land, Water, and
Growth, 34 URB. LAW. 971 (2002); Sarah J. Meyland, Land Use & the Protection of
Drinking Water Supplies, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 563 (1993); see also Patricia Gober et
al., Why Land Planners and Water Managers Don’t Talk to One Another and Why They
Should!, 26 SOC’Y & NAT. RES. 356 (2013). For regional case studies that discuss the landuse and water nexus, see Jean L. Coleman & Suzanne Sutro Rhees, Where Land and Water
Meet: Opportunities for Integrating Minnesota Water and Land Use Planning Statutes for
Water Sustainability, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 920 (2013); Anita P. Miller, Rural
Development Considerations for Growth Management, 43 NAT. RES. J. 781 (2003)
(discussing the need to integrate water availability when considering rural growth in New
Mexico); V.B. Price, Saved by Scarcity?, 42 NAT. RES. J. 1 (2002) (comparing
Albuquerque’s growth model to other arid and desert cities).
38. Craig Anthony Arnold, Adaptive Water Law, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1043 (2014);
Craig Anthony Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environmental Law: Integrationist and
Multimodal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 771, 837–41 (2011) (discussing “wet
growth”).
39. UN-Water defines water security as the capacity of a population to safeguard
sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining
livelihoods, human well-being, and socioeconomic development, for ensuring protection
against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in
a climate of peace and political stability. WATER SECURITY & THE GLOBAL WATER AGENDA:
A UN-WATER ANALYTICAL BRIEF (2013). For greater discussion of the evolution and
definitions of the term “water security,” see Christina Cook & Karen Bakker, Water
security: Debating an emerging paradigm, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 94 (2012).
40. See Michelle Bryan Mudd, A Next, Big Step for the West: Using Model
Legislation to Create a Water-Climate Element in Local Comprehensive Plans, 3 WASH. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2013); Keith H. Hirokawa, Driving Local Governments to Watershed
Governance, 42 ENVTL. L. 157, 165–73 (2012); Lincoln L. Davis, Assured Water Supply
Laws in the Sustainability Context, 4 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 167 (2010); Ryan
260
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racial exclusion have compounded inequality in fringe and island DUCs.41 That
literature is vital for examining rural poverty in the context of its municipal42
neighbors; nonetheless, it cannot fully explain persistent inequality in remote
DUCs.
As the only layer of general-purpose local government for remote DUCs,
California’s county governments have been charged with providing essential
services to those communities. Despite that charge, in the San Joaquin Valley
counties frequently prioritized investing in sprawl-based development at the urban
fringe, often at the expense of investing in DUCs.43 That history, combined with

Waterman, Addressing California’s Uncertain Water Future by Coordinating Long-Term
Land Use and Water Planning: Is a Water Element in the General Plan the Next Step?, 31
ECOLOGY L.Q. 117 (2004); but see S.B. 244, 2011 Leg. (Cal. 2011), codified in relevant
part at GOV’T CODE § 56430 (requiring cities and counties to evaluate municipal services in
disadvantaged island, fringe and remote DUCs and to examine extensions of service to those
communities when evaluating a local government’s application to expand its sphere of
influence—i.e., its growth boundary).
41. Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, supra note 3, at 937–49; Emily
Tumpson Molina, Race, Municipal Underbounding, and Coalitional Politics in Modesto,
California and Moore County, North Carolina, 1 KALFOU 180, 181–85 (2014); Noah J.
Durst, Municipal annexation and the selective underbounding of colonias in Texas’ Lower
Rio Grande Valley, 46 ENVT. & PLANNING A 1699 (2014); Vinit Mukhija & David R.
Mason, Reluctant Cities, Colonias and Municipal Underbounding in the US: Can Cities be
Convinced to Annex Poor Enclaves?, 50 URB. STUD. 2959 (2013); Ben Marsh, Allan M.
Parnell & Ann Moss Joyner, Institutionalization of Racial Inequality in Local Political
Geographies, 31 URB. GEOGRAPHY 691 (2010); Malini Ranganathan & Carolina Balazs,
Water marginalization at the urban fringe: environmental justice and urban political
ecology across the North–South divide, 36 URB. GEOGRAPHY 403, 407–08 (2015);
Anderson, Cities Inside Out, supra note 35, at 1106–13; Daniel T. Lichter & Domenico
Parisi, Municipal Underbounding: Annexation and Racial Exclusion in Small Southern
Towns, 72 RURAL SOC. 47 (2007); see also The Committee Concerning Community
Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 703–05, 707–09 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding
that residents of four majority-Latino unincorporated communities stated a viable claim that
the City of Modesto and County of Stanislaus engaged in intentional, racially discriminatory
policies to prevent those communities’ annexation and to deny those communities access to
adequate emergency response services).
42. I use the term “municipal” to refer to general-purpose local governments that are
“incorporated place[s] . . . established to provide governmental functions for a concentration
of people.” U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Population of Interest—Municipalities and Townships,
LISTS & STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENTS, https://www.census.gov/govs/go/municipal_
township_govs.html [https://perma.cc/WWL3-7HRW] (last revised Mar. 2, 2016).
43. In several communities, counties reallocated income derived from rural property
taxes to sprawl-based development on the periphery of cities. See, e.g., MADERA CTY.
PLANNING DEP’T, Housing Element and Background Report, supra note 3 (redirecting rural
tax monies to cities by funding the development of new housing near the boundaries of those
cities); Rubin et al., supra note 3, at 5–6, 16, 18–19, 21–22 (describing local governments’
refusals to address lack of access to essential infrastructure in San Joaquin Valley DUCs);
Jody Murray, Watch three decades of urban sprawl in Fresno and Clovis, squeezed into a
few seconds, FRESNO BEE (Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/article
167829902.html [https://perma.cc/P47Z-ELKC]; see also Alex Karner, Can California’s
San Joaquin Valley Conquer Urban Sprawl? (Essay), ZÓCALO PUBLIC SQUARE, (July 1,
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the prevalence of remote DUCs, suggests that cities cannot address the full range
of DUCs facing drinking water deficits.44 Additionally, even cities that wish to
extend drinking water service are often stymied by the high cost of those projects
because of California’s tax regime. Consequently, policymakers must broaden
their focus to consider the role of other local governmental entities and other
regulated water providers to bridge the safe drinking water gap in remote DUCs.

C.

Policymakers Must Consider a Wider Array of Funding
Tools and Potential Water Providers in Order to Extend
Safe Drinking Water to Remote DUCs.

As discussed above, several systemic constraints45 undermine efforts to
provide safe drinking water to remote DUCs: distance from cities with safe
drinking water, inadequate funding, and the high cost of creating, replacing and
improving drinking water infrastructure. This section proposes solutions for
overcoming those hurdles and ensuring safe drinking water reaches remote DUCs.

2014), http://www.zocalopublicsquare.org/2014/07/01/can-californias-san-joaquin-valleyconquer-urban-sprawl/ideas/nexus [https://perma.cc/HC4A-GEGM]; David Garcia, Why
it’s time for Central Valley cities to stop urban sprawl, op-ed, CENT. VALLEY BUSINESS J.
(Sept. 1, 2013), https://cvbj.biz/2013/09/01/time-central-valley-cities-stop-urban-sprawl/
[https://perma.cc/8Y34-J8ER]; Michelle Wilde Anderson, Sprawl’s Shepherd: The Rural
County (Essay), 100 CALIF. L. REV. 365 (2012); Christopher Silveira, An Urban
Morphology of Fresno, California: Its Structure and Growth, at 44–47, 54–55 (2010)
(unpublished undergraduate honors thesis, on file with author); see also Committee
Concerning Community Improvement, 583 F.3d at 697–98 (discussing plaintiff’s argument
that exclusion from property tax agreements between the City of Modesto and County of
Stanislaus, enabled racially exclusive annexation policies with respect to fringe and island
DUCs). In other cases, counties purposefully withheld infrastructure funding with the
intention of making DUCs so uninhabitable that they would collapse. See TULARE CTY.
PLANNING DEP’T, supra note 3, at § 2.D.3 (describing intention to deprive disadvantaged
unincorporated communities of funding and infrastructure investment).
Perhaps
unsurprisingly, those approaches did not cause DUCs to collapse, but instead, further
deepened rural poverty.
44. A recent study addressing water inequality in all San Joaquin Valley DUCs found
that 27 percent of DUC residents who lack access to safe water live within 500 feet of a city
boundary and within its sphere of influence. LONDON ET AL., supra note 13, at 32. Another
12 percent of DUC residents with unsafe drinking water live within a mile of a city
boundary, although primarily outside of those cities’ spheres of influence. Id. That data
suggests that the majority of DUC residents with unsafe drinking water—61 percent—live
more than a mile outside of a city boundary. Those findings indicate that although cities
play an important role in extending access to safe drinking water, a city-centric approach
alone cannot meet the needs of the majority of DUC residents without safe drinking water.
45. Although this commentary addresses institutional and systemic barriers to
delivering safe drinking water to rural communities, it is important to note that those barriers
are reinforced by additional anthropogenic impacts on water quantity and quality, including:
large-scale water infrastructure and transport programs; widespread and unremediated
industrial and agricultural pollution; climate change; and groundwater overdraft.
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1.

The State Water Resources Control Board Should Identify Possible
Partnerships Between Community Water Systems, Water Districts, and
Remote DUCs.

Although the State Water Resources Control Board (“State Water Board”)
has made progress in returning noncompliant46 drinking water systems to
compliance,47 out-of-compliance water systems continue to deliver unsafe water
to thousands of Californians.48 Additionally, the focus on bringing water systems
into compliance often fails to address the water safety concerns facing rural
residents who receive unsafe water from private wells.49
New research suggests that two-thirds of DUC residents live within 500 feet
of a compliant water system, and approximately 87 percent of DUC residents live
within three miles of a compliant water system.50 In light of that information,
policymakers should shift their focus to identifying proximate and compliant water
systems when attempting to address unsafe drinking water in remote DUCs. This
shift would require looking beyond cities to identify other compliant drinking
water providers, such as mutual water companies, community services districts,
municipal utilities districts, and state small systems.51

46. All drinking water systems with at least 15 connections, or at least 25 people who
receive water each day for sixty days each year, fall within the regulatory framework of the
federal Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-27. Id. at § 300f(4)(A) (defining
“public water system”). Systems with 5 to 14 connections are regulated as “state small
water systems,” Cal. Health & Safety Code § 116275(n), under the California Safe Drinking
Water Act, id. §§ 116270–725 (2017). A regulated water system is “compliant” if it meets
federal and state drinking water requirements, and it is “noncompliant” if it fails to meet
those standards. See Id. § 116287.
47. See HRTW Dataset, supra note 13 (categorizing compliant, noncompliant, and
“returned to compliance” drinking water systems).
48. Id.
49. To be sure, data regarding water quality for individual domestic wells is sparse,
making it difficult even to identify at-risk private well communities. Additionally, regulators
often struggle to navigate the difficult line between protecting public health and disrupting
any private property rights related to use of an unsafe private well for that property owner’s
drinking water needs.
50. LONDON ET AL., supra note 13, at 31–41.
51. The lion’s share of DUC consolidations and extensions of service have involved
cities. See STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., MANDATORY CONSOLIDATION, supra note 17;
see also STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., Consolidation Funding Projects for
Disadvantaged Water Systems with Violations Dataset, CONSOLIDATION STATISTICS,
https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/drinking_water/certlic/drinkingwater/dashboard.html
[https://perma.cc/XC98-QLQ4]. When examining the broader universe of water system
consolidations, however, mutual water companies, community services districts and public
utility districts have played an important supplemental role. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL
BD., Consolidated Water Systems List: Completed Consolidations Beginning January 1,
2017 and December 31, 2017, CONSOLIDATION STATISTICS, https://www.waterboards.
ca.gov/drinking_water/certlic/drinkingwater/dashboard.html
[https://perma.cc/97TT-W
UTR].
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Those water systems that are proximate to remote DUCs have a geographic
advantage in that they may be able to provide more cost-effective extensions of
service. At the same time, increasing the number of water users for those systems
can also have a stabilizing effect for the receiving system—a larger number of
ratepayers increases economies of scale, thereby decreasing the fixed costs of water
provision for all residents of that water system.
The State Water Board may also increase access to safe water by evaluating
partnerships between nonresidential water districts,52 such as irrigation districts,
and remote DUCs. In some cases, water exchanges that enable water mixing may
dilute water contaminants that are especially expensive to treat. For example, the
remote DUCs of Allensworth53 and Alpaugh54 have faced ongoing challenges in
addressing arsenic contamination for decades. Those communities jointly applied

52. The State Water Board has reported consolidations involving irrigation districts
for commercial drinking water provision, but thus far, there have been very few, if any, nonconsolidation partnerships between irrigation districts and residential drinking water
providers. See STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., Consolidated Water Systems List, supra
note 51.
53. See STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., Sampling Results: Well 01 - East - Raw,
CAL. DRINKING WATER WATCH, https://sdwis.waterboards.ca.gov/PDWW/JSP/Sampling
ResultsByStoret.jsp?SystemNumber=5400544&SamplingPointID=002&SamplingPointNa
me=WELL+01+++EAST++RAW&Storet=&ChemicalName=&begin_date=&end_date=
%20(2018) [https://perma.cc/BGV2-APUY] (providing pretreatment contaminant levels for
Allensworth’s east well); STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., Sampling Results: Well 01 West - Raw, CAL. DRINKING WATER WATCH, https://sdwis.waterboards.ca.gov/PDWW/
JSP/SamplingResultsByStoret.jsp?SystemNumber=5400544&SamplingPointID=003&Sa
mplingPointName=WELL+02+++WEST++RAW&Storet=&ChemicalName=&begin_dat
e=&end_date=%20%20(2018) [https://perma.cc/S99W-88FS] (reporting pretreatment
contaminant levels for Allensworth’s west well); see also Tammerlin Drummond, A Lost
Horizon: Allensworth was an ex-slave who envisioned a place where blacks could live
freely. Racism and hard times eventually killed his utopia. But its memory has survived,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1991).
54. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., Sampling Results: Well 01 Raw, CAL.
DRINKING WATER WATCH, https://sdwis.waterboards.ca.gov/PDWW/JSP/Sampling
ResultsByStoret.jsp?SystemNumber=5410050&SamplingPointID=004&SamplingPointNa
me=WELL+01++RAW&Storet=&ChemicalName=&begin_date=&end_date=%20(2018)
[https://perma.cc/99ES-GED6] (arsenic levels for one of Alpaugh’s source wells); STATE
WATER RES. CONTROL BD., Sampling Results: Well 10 Raw, CAL. DRINKING WATER
WATCH, https://sdwis.waterboards.ca.gov/PDWW/JSP/SamplingResultsByStoret.jsp? Sys
temNumber=5410050&SamplingPointID=003&SamplingPointName=WELL+10++RAW
&Storet=&ChemicalName=&begin_date=&end_date=%20(2018)
[https://perma.cc/37
DQ-HS35] (arsenic levels Alpaugh’s second source well); see also Jessica Peres,
Contaminated Alpaugh Water: High Levels of Arsenic in the City’s Water, ABC 30 ACTION
NEWS KFSN-TV (July 30, 2008), http://abc30.com/archive/6297435 [https://perma.cc
/ZCE5-JMTP]; Holly Kernan, Calif. Town Fights for Clean Tap Water, NATL. PUB. RADIO
(Jan. 24, 2005), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4463526 [https:/
/perma.cc/D6FW-3MX3].
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for state funding55 to explore the feasibility of a pilot program that would allow
water mixing at a one-to-one exchange rate with an irrigation district with water
that fell within the maximum contaminant level for arsenic.56 Although the pilot
project ultimately did not result in a water-exchange program,57 it provided an
alternative framework for collaboration across domestic and nondomestic water
districts.58 That framework may become increasingly useful as communities
undertake the groundwater sustainability planning process.59
2.

In the Absence of Tax Reform, the State Must Commit to Creating
Ongoing Funding to Support Access to Safe Drinking Water for All DACs.

Perhaps the single greatest impediment to achieving safe drinking water is
the high cost of water infrastructure improvement, repair, and replacement. Recent
projects repairing or replacing water distribution pipelines have ranged from $1.1
million and $4.45 million per mile of pipeline laid.60 In addition to those high

55. CAL. NAT. RES. AGENCY, AAA Water and MT Sewer Project, BOND
ACCOUNTABILITY (2015), http://bondaccountability.resources.ca.gov/Project.aspx?Project
PK=3793&PropositionPK=4 [https://perma.cc/R8GU-9JMJ].
56. Bernice Yeung, California Drinking Water: Rural Towns Devise Unique Plan to
Solve Problems, CAL. WATCH (May 14, 2012).
57. CAL. NAT. RES. AGENCY, Alpaugh CSD Arsenic Treatment—Construction
Project, BOND ACCOUNTABILITY, http://bondaccountability.resources.ca.gov/Project.aspx?
ProjectPK=22101&PropositionPK=48 [https://perma.cc/K7UH-AV53] (reporting the
allocation of Prop 1 funding for the purposes of creating an arsenic treatment plant in
Alpaugh).
58. The remote Tulare County DUCs of East Orosi, Monson, Seville, Sultana, and
Yettem have explored the possibility of partnering with the Alta Irrigation District to
develop long-term, regional solutions for delivering safe and affordable drinking water.
COMMUNITY WATER CTR., NORTHERN TULARE COUNTY REGIONAL SAFE DRINKING WATER
PROJECT (Oct. 2017), https://www.communitywatercenter.org/northern_tulare_county
_region [https://perma.cc/3FMH-4UDS].
59. California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) requires
groundwater users to develop groundwater sustainability plans, which in turn will require
coordination between those users to achieve their sustainability goals. WATER CODE §
10727.
60. See EAST BAY MUN. UTIL. DIST., PIPELINE REPAIRS REVEAL WATER LEGACY,
https://www.ebmud.com/about-us/construction-myneighborhood/pipeline-repairs-revealwater-legacy [https://perma.cc/AWB7-NGG8] (stating that the average cost to replace a
mile of water transmission pipe is $2.4 million); EAST BAY MUN. UTIL. DIST., $4 Million
Grant Awarded to Expand San Ramon Valley Recycled Water Program, PRESS RELEASES
(Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.ebmud.com/about-us/news/press-releases/4-million-grantawarded-expand-san-ramon-valley-recycled-water-program [https://perma.cc/836T-LEVJ]
(reporting that the cost of a nearly nine-mile pipeline extension was $11.8 million, or
approximately $1.3 million per mile of pipe); SACRAMENTO SUBURBAN WATER DISTRICT,
WATER TRANSMISSION MAIN ASSET MANAGEMENT PLAN 40 (Aug. 2011) (estimating the
cost of water distribution pipeline replacement at $1.1 million per mile for a 16” pipeline to
$4.45 million per mile for a 54” pipeline in 2011 dollars). Those estimates appear to be
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costs, California Proposition 21861 prohibits local governments from levying any
special tax or assessment on a property if that assessment does not confer a “special
benefit” to the property being taxed.62 California courts have interpreted that
prohibition strictly—they have repeatedly struck down assessments that failed to
confer specific benefits to the individual property being taxed.63 That prohibition
has stymied counties and other local governments that have attempted to
redistribute funding within their borders to address historic and persistent
inequality in the provision of essential infrastructure.
As a result, disadvantaged communities are faced with shouldering the full
cost of improving their water infrastructure. Proposition 218’s provisions fail to
account for prior histories of racial discrimination and disinvestment, and those
provisions penalize communities for their own poverty. This outcome is punitive
and futile: if disadvantaged communities had the financial means to repair their
water systems,64 they likely would not meet the definition of “disadvantaged” set
forth by the Legislature.

limited to the cost of labor and construction and do not include additional transactional costs,
such as purchasing easements or regulatory compliance.
61. CAL. CONST. arts. XIII C, XIII D (1996); see CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, NOVEMBER
5, 1996 GENERAL ELECTION STATEMENT OF VOTE 43–45 (1996) (reporting the passage of
Proposition 218).
62. CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, §§ 4 & 6; see generally CAL. DEBT & INVESTMENT
ADVISORY COMM., OPPORTUNITIES TO USE ASSESSMENT DISTRICTS TO FINANCE FACILITIES
AND SERVICES IN CALIFORNIA TODAY, No. 15–07 (2015), http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac
/publications/opportunities.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4GY-BRDH] (explaining Proposition
218’s requirements and limitations on property taxation and public debt).
63. Silicon Valley Taxpayers’ Ass’n v. Santa Clara Cty. Open Space Auth., 44 Cal.
4th 431, 441–43, 449–52 (2008); Town of Tiburon v. Bonander, 180 Cal. App. 4th 1057,
1080–88 (2009).
64. One of the most disturbing examples of Proposition 218’s punitive effect can be
found in the remote DUC of Lanare (Fresno County). After years of grappling with unsafe
drinking water, Fresno County applied for funding to construct an arsenic treatment plant in
Lanare. In obtaining that funding, neither the County nor the State Water Board examined
whether residents had the means to pay for the high cost of running the treatment plant
through increased water rates, driving the Lanare Community Services District into a
receivership. Years later, the arsenic treatment plant remains closed while residents
continue to receive unsafe water and struggle to pay the debts incurred from the plant’s
creation. Ezra David Romero & Kerry Klein, They Built It, But Couldn’t Afford to Run It—
Clean Drinking Water Fight Focuses on Gaps in Funding, VALLEY PUB. RADIO (June 6,
2017), http://kvpr.org/post/they-built-it-couldn-t-afford-run-it-clean-drinking-water-fightfocuses-gaps-funding [https://perma.cc/UN5Q-G8HL]; Laura Bliss, Why California’s
Poorest Towns Still Can’t Connect to Water, CITYLAB (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.citylab
.com/equity/2015/10/why-californias-poorest-towns-still-cant-connect-to-water/409516/
[https://perma.cc/L4WQ-3BF5]; Alice Daniel, Central Valley Community Fights for Clean
Drinking Water, KQED (Nov. 18, 2013), https://www.kqed.org/stateofhealth/16161/
central-valley-community-fight s-for-clean-water [https://perma.cc/E9XG-6WUR]; David
Bacon, Dying for a Glass of Clean Water in California’s San Joaquin Valley (Photo Essay),
New America Media (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/2939-dying-fora-glass-of-clean-water-in-california%E2%80%99s-san-joaquin-valley [https://perma.cc/G5
GT-BJTF].
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In light of the slim possibility that Californians will reform their tax regime,65
the State must step up to bridge funding gaps related to safe and affordable drinking
water provision in DUCs. Those funding efforts should provide ongoing funding
for system consolidation and regionalization,66 water infrastructure planning and
construction, and stopgap support for operations and maintenance for DUCs whose
residents cannot afford paying increased rates if their water is remediated.67
Whether that funding takes the form of bonds, fees, or set-asides from the General
Fund, the State must commit resources in order to effectuate the human right to
water in DACs.
3.

State Funding Programs Should Increase Set Asides for DACs and Raise
Current Caps on Funding.

At the direction of the Legislature, the State Water Board has set aside some
bond-financed grant funds exclusively for DACs.68 As the implementation of
Proposition 1 has demonstrated, however, those grant programs did not have
adequate funding to address unsafe water in DACs throughout the State. Although
the State Water Board has prioritized and incentivized funding for infrastructure

65. Liam Dillon, A major change to Proposition 13 takes its first step toward the
2018 ballot, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-polca-essential-politics-updates-a-major-change-to-proposition-13-takes-1513368938-htmlsto
ry.html [https://perma.cc/W9K8-3T98].
66. In the context of California water policy, “consolidation” is a term of art that
refers to “joining two or more public water systems, state small water systems, or affected
residents not served by a public water system, into a single public water system.” CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 116681(e). “Reorganization” is a local government term of art
under the Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Local Government Reorganization Act of 2000, Gov’t
Code §§ 56000–57550, which defines a “reorganization” as any application to undertake
“two or more changes of [local government] organization within a single proposal”—e.g.,
the merger of three or more special districts into a single local government entity. GOV’T
CODE § 56073; see also id. § 56021 (providing a list of possible changes of organization).
67. Lawmakers have introduced legislation to address some of those funding needs
this year. For example, Senate Bill 5, a bond measure that includes funding for water
infrastructure with set asides for DACs, will be referred to voters as Proposition 68. CAL.
SEC’Y OF STATE, QUALIFIED STATEWIDE BALLOT MEASURES, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elec
tions/ballot-measures/qualified-ballot-measures [https://perma.cc/E2J3-FKSQ] (last visited
Feb. 20, 2018).
68. See, e.g., WATER CODE § 79724–79725 (setting aside funds to improve drinking
water infrastructure for DACs); id. § 79742(d) (setting aside 10% of funds related to
integrated regional water management planning for climate change and regional water
security for DACs at the state level); Id. § 79745 (same, applying the 10% set aside to each
hydrological region of the state); Id. § 79774(d) (setting aside funds for the prevention and
cleanup of groundwater used as a source of drinking water); see also id. § 79723
(prioritizing, but not setting aside, funds for wastewater infrastructure projects serving
DACs); PUB. RES. CODE § 75022 (2018) (prioritizing drinking water infrastructure funding
for DACs).
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improvements that benefit DACs,69 insofar as it has the authority to do so, it should
utilize its rulemaking authority to reserve additional funds across its programs for
drinking water projects that serve DAC.
Additionally, as the State Water Board revises the Drinking Water State
Revolving Fund70 intended use plan (IUP),71 it should revisit its per-connection
limits on funding for DACs. Under the current IUP, the State Board may only
spend $30,000 per connection to address water safety issues for a community, and
it may award up to $60,000 per connection for projects that provide a “regional
benefit.”72 This formulation falls short of serving remote DUCs’ needs in at least
three ways. First, the $30,000 per connection award is often much lower than the
cost of connecting a DUC to a compliant system or constructing new infrastructure
to bring a system into compliance. Second, it ignores remote DUCs’ geographic
isolation, making it difficult for those communities to qualify for “regional benefit”
funding because those remote DUCs often are not proximate to more than one other
water system. Third, the current funding caps do not take into account remote
DUCs’ long histories of racial exclusion and disinvestment.
The State cannot fix decades of disinvestment in low-income communities
by capping support at $30,000, or even $60,000, per connection.73 As part of its

69. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., STATE OF CALIFORNIA DRINKING WATER
STATE REVOLVING FUND AND THE WATER QUALITY, SUPPLY, AND INFRASTRUCTURE
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2014 INTENDED USE PLAN: STATE FISCAL YEAR 2017–18, at 43–45
(June 20, 2017), available at https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/board_decisions/adop
ted_orders/resolutions/2017/dwsrf_iup_sfy2017_18_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MP2ZKFLX] [hereinafter “2017–18 INTENDED USE PLAN”].
70. The Safe Drinking Water State Revolving Fund is a program jointly funded by
the federal and state government and administered by the State Water Resources Control
Board. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-12 (2012); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 116760–116762.60
(2018).
71. States that participate in the revolving fund program are required to produce and
share for public review annual intended use plans. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-12(b) (2012).
72. 2017-18 INTENDED USE PLAN, supra note 69, at 39–43. The “regional benefit”
usually applies to water system consolidations involving three or more drinking water
providers. Id. It is important to credit State Water Board staff for their efforts to address
the unique harms facing DUCs broadly and remote DUCs in particular. Nevertheless,
although staff may recommend that the State Water Board lift the per-connection funding
cap on a project-by-project basis, staff do not have the authority or discretion to lift the perconnection cap to account for historic disinvestment, rurality, or the severity of a water
quality problems in DUCs and DACs.
73. For example, in the remote DUC of Seville (Tulare County), emergency repairs
to the water distribution system cost roughly $66,667 per connection for 75 service
connections serving approximately 480 residents. State Water Res. Control Bd., Report &
Resolution Authorizing the Deputy Director of the Division of Financial Assistance to
Provide Proposition 1 Drinking Water Grant Funding to Tulare County for the Replacement
of Seville Water Company’s Distribution System in an Amount Not to Exceed $5 Million
(Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/board_info/agendas/2017/jan/010417_3
.pdf; see State Water Res. Control Bd., SWRCB Board Meeting – January 4, 2017,
YOUTUBE (published Jan. 4, 2017), https://youtu.be/kHCKeq3E0a0?t=24m25s [https://per
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process for setting a per-connection cap, the State Water Board should evaluate its
prior efforts to award funds to remote DUCs and the value of its prior awards to
those communities, and determine the average cost of those projects based on
varying population levels. Those average cost estimates have greater predictive
value, and may be better instruments for determining project funding, than a perconnection funding cap. Additionally, the Board should determine if remote DUCs
experienced historical disinvestment and should calculate the estimated value of
those years of disinvestment when considering whether to grant funds in excess of
current per-connection caps. Finally, when assessing how to distribute its funds,
the State Water Board should explicitly prioritize funding projects in vulnerable
communities that were subjected to disinvestment.

Conclusion
Over the past decade, California has made tremendous strides in attempting
to address water poverty throughout the State. Nonetheless, after a decade of water
infrastructure investment projects, tens of thousands of low-income Californians
still have not received safe and affordable drinking water, and those water deficits
are especially severe in disadvantaged unincorporated communities. The gap
between the State’s funding programs and access to safe drinking water for DUC
residents suggests that the State must look to a wider array of policy prescriptions
in order to realize its commitment to advancing the human right to water for all
Californians.

ma.cc/KBG7-XY4T] (discussion and unanimous approval of the resolution take place
between minutes 24:25 and 34:18 of the recording).
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